Supreme Court decision · Civil Law
Philippine Land Improvement Co. v. Simeon Blas
G.R. No. 33646 · Promulgated December 29, 1930 · Ponente: Villa Real
In brief
This case is about enforcing a contract of promise to sell land involving ownership, possession, and the obligations of coowners and heirs under a partition agreement.
Torrens Title, Land Registration, Partition, Deed of Sale, Contract Enforcement
Related cases
- G.R. No. 32598 Gonzalez v. Turla (Previous decision in Civil Law)
- G.R. No. 32260 Philippine National Bank v. Rocha (Next decision in Civil Law)
Full text
| |||||||||||
The compromise herein quoted is thus seen to consist of two parts: The first, which is a promise made by Tomas Arguelles, as manager of the Maysilo Estate, and by Jose Varela Calderon, as attorney for said estate, both duly authorized by the commissioners appointed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in civil case No. 391 in connection with the partition of the Maysilo Estate, to sell to Simeon Blas a portion of the land of said Maysilo Estate in Suluc, barrio of Tinajeros, municipality of Malabon, some 5 hectares in area, which portion has been used for fishery by said Simeon Blas, at P200 per hectare, payable in installments, in consideration of the withdrawal of the opposition filed by the latter to the application for registration presented by Gonzalo Tuason y Patiño and others in case No. 4429 of the Court of Land Registration; and the second, wherein Simeon Blas recognizes the estate's ownership of the lands occupied by him and makes delivery thereof and of the lawful possession of the same to Tomas Arguelles, as manager of said estate, and of all the parcel or parcels of land by him possessed, with the promise of sale.
Inasmuch as the commissioners appointed by the Court of First Instance of Rizal in civil case No. 391, in the partition of the Maysilo Estate, authorized Tomas Arguelles and Jose Varela Calderon to enter into the contract of promise to sell contained in the compromise in their name and stead, they were bound to perform said contract by executing in favor of Simeon Blas the final deed of sale after said estate had been registered in accordance with the new Land Registration Law , for which powers had been conferred upon them by said Court of First Instance. Inasmuch as said commissioners acted by virtue of an agreement of the coowners of the Maysilo Estate, and under authority of the court, their acts were the acts of said coowners. After the ownership and registration of the Maysilo Estate were adjudicated to the testamentary estate of Gonzalo Tuason y Patiño and to others, including the property in question, the obligation binding upon said commissioners to execute said final deed of sale passed to the administratrix of said testamentary estate and to the heirs upon receipt by the said testamentary estate and to the heirs upon receipt by the latter of the property left by their deceased father.
The fact that the Maysilo Estate was adjudicated to the testamentary estate of Gonzalo Tuason y Patiño and to some other coowners, the portion including the land in question being allotted to the testamentary estate, without any notation or memorandum of a deed of promise to sell executed to Simeon Blas by the commissioners, and the fact that over one year has elapsed from the record of the decree of registration, does not prevent the latter from enforcing his right acquired by virtue of said deed of promise to sell, for the reason that the question raised herein is not for review of a decree of registration, which may only be made within the year following the record of said decree and on the ground of fraud, in accordance with the provision of section 38, Act No. 496, but for the performance of an obligation arising from a contract. (Cabanos vs. Register of Deeds of Laguna, and Obiñana, 40 Phil., 620; Paguio vs. Manlapid, 52 Phil., 534; Garcia vs. Doncillo, 53 Phil., 682.) Admitting the power of the commissioners to enter into the contract of the sale in question, and in view of the fact that the land in question forms part of the portion of the Maysilo Estate which fell to the heirs of Gonzalo Tuason y Patiño, the latter were bound to perform the obligation contracted by the commissioners, who could no longer comply with it on account of having been released from their duties.
It is alleged and contended by the plaintiff that having acquired the Maysilo Estate from the former owners in good faith and for a valuable consideration, and having had the transfer certificate of title issued in its name free from all charges and encumbrances, and without the notation of any promise to sell to Simeon Blas, the latter has no cause of action against it to enforce the performance of an obligation that has not been contracted.
The record shows that the incorporators of the plaintiff corporation, as well as the directors and stockholders thereof, are the coowners of the Maysilo Estate, with the exception of Gregorio Araneta, who received a share in consideration of his professional services. As such coowners of the Maysilo Estate which was divided among them, they were bound by the contract of promise to sell execute by the commissioners appointed by the court in the partition proceedings of said estate by their own agreement; and since they constitute the majority of the incorporators, directors, and shareholders of the plaintiff entity, the latter cannot claim ignorance of the existence of said contract for the mere fact that as a corporation, it has a juridical personality distinct and independent of every member composing it, as if when the incorporators organized themselves into a corporation, they ceased to know what they had known before regarding the property invested in the corporation, and were released from their contractual obligation.
With regard to the shareholders who are not coowners of the Maysilo Estate, they are bound by the acts of the directors, as is the corporation as a whole. (Zamboanga Transportation Co. vs. Bachrach Motor Co., 52 Phil., 244.).
If the coowners of the Maysilo Estate, who ought to have known of the promise of sale made by their commissioners to Simeon Blas, are the incorporators, directors, and shareholders of the plaintiff entity, and since the latter cannot therefore be ignorant of the existence of said obligation, it cannot shield itself behind the transfer certificate of title issued to it, simply because it does not there appear that any promise to sell was made to the defendant, for, being aware of the existence of said obligation, it cannot plead good faith in the acquisition of said estate.lawphi1>net
The plaintiff also contends that since the defendant has failed to comply with the conditions incumbent upon him under the contract of promise to sell regarding the payment of the price, he has no right to demand the fulfillment of said promise.
While it is true that the agreement of compromise, in speaking of the manner of payment of the sale price, uses the phrase "deed of promise to sell," indicating that 20 per centum should be paid at the time of delivering the "deed of promise to sell," 40 per centum at the time of delivering the Torrens title in the name of Simeon Blas, and the remaining 40 per centum within two year from the date of the "deed of promise to sell," we do not believe that the parties really had in mind the deed of promise to sell, but rather the final deed of sale; and this for the reason that it is not the deed to issue the transfer certificate of title, but the final and absolute deed of sale, without which the obligation of delivering the Torrens title in the name of Simeon Blas for the payment of the 40 per centum comprising the second installment cannot be complied with, nor can that for the payment of the third and last installment of 40 per centum, for the reason that the registration of the Maysilo Estate under the Torrens system might last over two years, and said period might elapse before the transfer of title to the portion in question, in which case the payment of the third installment would necessarily have to be made after the lapse of two years from the date of the deed of promise to sell. If the payment of the first installment of 20 per centum was to be made upon delivery to the purchaser of the final deed of sale, and not, as the compromise erroneously states, of the deed of promise to sell and if the execution of said deed of sale was incumbent upon the partitioning commissioners, or in their default, on the administratrix of the testamentary estate of Gonzalo Tuason y Patiño to which the land in question had been assigned as part of the property pertaining to said testamentary estate, or, in default of said administratrix, the heirs of the late Gonzalo Tuason y Patiño, or, in their default, the plaintiff corporation, as the new owner of said property, whereas none of them has delivered to Simeon Blas the final deed of sale, therefore the latter is not bound to pay the first installment of 20 per centum, and hence, has not failed to perform his obligation in such wise as to give rise to rescission of the deed of promise to sell.
For all the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so hold that the promise to sell made by the commissioners authorized by the court having cognizance of a case of partition of property, is binding upon the coowners and their heirs, as well as upon the corporation formed with the property falling to them in the partition, converted into shares, they themselves being the shareholders and directors, notwithstanding the fact that said property was registered under the Torrens system and a certificate of title issued in favor of the testamentary estate of the predecessor of said heirs, and a transfer certificate of title was issued in the name of said corporation without any notation of said deed of promise to sell; and the holder of the option or promise to sell may compel said corporation to comply with the obligation contracted by said partitioning commissioners by virtue of the aforesaid promise to sell.
By virtue whereof, the judgment appealed from is reversed, the complaint dismissed, and the cross-complaint sustained; and the plaintiff entity is hereby ordered to execute the final deed of sale in favor of the defendant Simeon Blas, and to deliver to the latter the proper transfer certificate of title, in accordance with the terms of the deed of promise to sell, Exhibit 1, with costs against the plaintiff and appellant. So ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Johnson, Street, Malcolm, Villamor, Ostrand, Johns and Romualdez, JJ., concur.