Supreme Court decision · Criminal Law
People v. Ibanga
G.R. No. L-39502 · Promulgated September 24, 1983 · Ponente: Fernando
In brief
This case is about the appeal of Isagani Ibanga from a rape conviction, where the Supreme Court reversed due to failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt and reliance on complainant's testimony contradicted by eyewitness.
Rape, Presumption of Innocence, Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt, Witness Credibility, Acquittal
Related cases
- G.R. No. L-36759 People of the Philippines v. Imbo (Cited in this decision)
- G.R. No. L-47724 People v. Maranan (Previous decision in Criminal Law)
- G.R. No. L-39746 People v. San Miguel (Next decision in Criminal Law)
Full text
SECOND DIVISION
[ G.R. No. L-39502. September 24, 1983 ]
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE, VS. ISAGANI IBANGA, DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
D E C I S I O N
FERNANDO, C.J.:
There is relevance to this excerpt in People v. Imbo[1] in
the disposition of this appeal from a conviction for the crime of rape: "The difficulty, recognized and
acknowledged, in the decision-making process where the prosecution is for rape,
arises from the fact that
usually only the participants can testify as to the alleged sexual abuse. The accused may deny such an occurrence, put
up the defense that he was somewhere
else, or allege the consent on the part of the complainant. The court then is left with no choice but to
exert the utmost effort to determine the likelihood that a sexual act did take place and under what
circumstances. Such choice is not always
easy."[2] There is, however, this difference. In addition to the complainant and the
accused, now appellant, one Ernesto Esteleides
testified as to the likelihood of the offense having taken place. On behalf of appellant, there is testimony
from Romeo Secreto who was on the ground floor when
the rape was allegedly committed. After
a careful study of the evidence of record, there is sufficient ground for the
belief that the constitutional presumption of innocence[3] was not overcome.
It is, accordingly, our
judgment that there was a failure to obey the mandate of the
Constitution, which as authoritatively construed, calls for proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Hence reversal is
indicated.
Complainant Clarissa Punzalan testified that she was alone in her house on the
afternoon of
The version of appellant, as set forth in his brief,
follows: "That in the afternoon of
To repeat, a study of the
evidence of record calls for the reversal of the judgment of conviction.
1. There is no question as
to appellant being in the house of complainant at that particular time the
alleged occurrence was imputed to him.
Both prosecution and defense are agreed on that point. The difference lies in the fact that while
complainant alleged that he just went there with his friend Secreto,
appellant, through the testimony of Danilo Panganiban, maintained that he was sent for by her.[20] He did not stop there. He pointed out that Romeo Secreto
was with him; they were riding in one bicycle.[21] He was corroborated by Romeo Secreto who was on the wheel of such bicycle.[22] He recalled her exact words: "Hoy, Danny, pakisabi
mo kay Ganie (sic) na magpunta siya
rito."[23] Complainant did not deny that both Panganiban and Secreto passed by
her house but she asserted that she talked only to Panganiban[24] who inquired about her parents and was
informed that they were not there.[25] The version of Panganiban
and Secreto appears to be the more credible. When appellant was informed of the request of
complainant, there were two other persons present, Boy Secreto
and Ruben Secreto.[26] Either of them could have been called to the
witness stand by the prosecution so that they could refute what was testified
to by Panganiban and Secreto. Neither one was. The testimony as to the complainant having
sent for appellant is thus entitled to credence and belief.
2. The next question is what happened on that occasion. As could be expected, both prosecution and
defense had diametrically opposed versions.
There is no need to repeat what was testified to by complainant as to
her having been raped. Appellant, in his
testimony, when asked whether or not he committed the alleged rape,
categorically answered: "No,
sir."[27]
After a few more questions, he then stated that according to Panganiban, "Clarissa was asking me to go to her
house."[28] At first, he refused to believe him
because when he "passed by the house of Clarissa and [he] saw Clarissa and
she saw [him] and [he] said if she really wanted to talk
to [him] she should have told [him] herself."[29]
But he proceeded to the house of
complainant nonetheless as Romeo Secreto told him
"that I was really being called by Clarissa and that he is willing to
accompany me."[30]
Thus accompanied by Romeo Secreto, he proceeded to
her house.[31]
When she was asked if she really sent for him, "she said yes and she
invited [him] to go up."[32]
Only he went up as Romeo Secreto who was with him was
not invited to do so;[33] instead, Secreto
proceeded to the ground floor "because it also serves as a receiving
room."[34]
When both of them were seated at the balcony, he asked her why she wanted him
to see her.[35] This was her response: "She asked at once if I would like to go
with her to elope."[36] He in turn asked her: "Why should I go with you, what happened
that you are going to go away (layas)?"[37] She explained why: "Clarissa said that she was scolded by
her father and she was beaten up."[38] She added the reason for such action on the
part of her father: "That she came
late from a party and that she usually go (sic) out in a 'lupakan' and sometimes she
passed the night somewhere else."[39] He explained further, by way of refuting
Clarissa's statement that he had a gun, that there was no truth to it, he not
having "handled a gun but [he
had] seen a gun."[40] Up to the time he was testifying, he had not
done so, having handled only "a wooden gun that [he used] in the
PMT."[41] While he admitted that he was a security
guard, his job as such did not require him to do so as he only checked
"those persons who go out because [his] uncle is also
associated with the owner of the shop."[42] He answered categorically that at no time
that afternoon while he was in the house of Clarissa did he enter any bedroom
on that house as he "just stayed as far as the balcony."[43] Later on, he gave lie to the allegation of
the complainant that he "courted her but she refused to accept [him]."[44] The truth, according to him, is "siya ang nagkagusto."[45] As he was told by another friend that she
had a crush on him, they become sweethearts in June of 1970, but by December
they were no longer so, their relationship having ended in August of 1970.[46] This was the reason, according to him: "Because she had many boyfriends, and
one time I saw her with a man at the beach in our place [and] the people have a
common knowledge that she had many boyfriends."[47] Nor during such period did they have any sexual
intercourse. The most he could remember
is that he had kissed her twice in a dance.[48]
He was quite categorical that in the afternoon "of
3. The decisive question is
whether the prosecution was able to introduce evidence showing appellant's
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. It cannot
be said it succeeded in such a task.
What was testified to by complainant must be weighed in the scales
against that of the appellant. Whatever
probative value did attach to her version suffered further with the testimony
of an eyewitness, Romeo Secreto. There was no question that he was on the
lower floor. He was therefore in a
position to observe what happened when complainant and appellant were together
in the balcony. Complainant in alleging
rape was quite emphatic as to her not submitting willingly, struggling to free
herself from appellant's embrace and clinging to the balustrade of the balcony
to prevent appellant from bringing her to the bedroom.[63]
Moreover, even after she was inside, she did not stop her resistance; according
to her, she kicked and boxed appellant and shouted for help from Romeo Secreto who was downstairs with these words: "Tulungan mo ako, may ginagawang kawalanghiyaan ang kasama mo."[64] Secreto, however, denied that there was such a plea for
help. As noted earlier, he was on the
ground floor of the house of complainant.[65]
He could see what occurred thereafter as the floor of the house is made of
bamboo slats.[66]
He even remembered that there were three chairs in the balcony.[67]
All he observed was that complainant and appellant spent the time conversing
with each other while he, Secreto, was reading comic
books.[68]
He was extensively cross?examined
by the prosecuting fiscal.[69] Nothing which in any way contradicted what
was testified to by him was elicited.
There is, on the record, therefore, a statement of an eyewitness
corroborating appellant's testimony. The
prosecution called another witness, Ernesto Esteleides,
to the stand. At the time he testified
in 1972, he was fourteen years old.[70] On the afternoon of
4. From the above facts, the
conviction cannot stand. This excerpt
from People v. Gabiana[88]
finds application: "The fundamental
right to the presumption of innocence calls for the utmost respect. So it has been the consistent ruling of this
Court. It follows, to paraphrase People
v. Dramayo, that accusation may not be equated with
guilt. The prosecution must successfully
discharge the burden of proof that the offense had been committed and the
person responsible for that commission is the accused. The standard has always been proof beyond
reasonable doubt. That goes back to the
1903 decision of
WHEREFORE, the decision on appeal finding appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape and sentencing him to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua is reversed and
appellant is acquitted. He is entitled to be released from
imprisonment forthwith unless detained for some other valid cause according to law.
Concepcion, Jr., J., no part.
De Castro, J., on sick leave.
[1]
G.R. No. L-36759,
[2] Ibid, 357.
[3] According to Article IV, Section 19 of the Constitution: "In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. * * *."
[4] T.s.n., Session of
[5] Ibid, Session of
[6] Ibid, 22.
[7] Ibid.
[8] Ibid, 23.
[9] Ibid, Session of
[10] Ibid, 5.
[11] Ibid.
[12] Ibid.
[13] Ibid, 6.
[14] Ibid.
[15] Ibid, Session of
[16] Ibid.
[17] Ibid, Session of
[18] Ibid, 11.
[19]
Brief for the Defendant-Appellant, 2-3. Counsel
for Appellant cited T.s.n., sessions of
[20] T.s.n., Session of
[21] Ibid, 11.
[22] Ibid, 48.
[23] Ibid.
[24] T.s.n., Session of
[25] Ibid.
[26] T.s.n., Session of
[27] T.s.n., Session of
[28] Ibid, 11.
[29] Ibid, 11-12.
[30] Ibid, 12.
[31] Ibid.
[32] Ibid, 13.
[33] Ibid.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Ibid, 14.
[36] Ibid.
[37] Ibid.
[38] Ibid, 15.
[39] Ibid.
[40] Ibid.
[41] Ibid.
[42] Ibid, 16.
[43] Ibid, 17.
[44] Ibid, 18.
[45] Ibid.
[46] Ibid, 19.
[47] Ibid, 19-20.
[48] Ibid, 20.
[49] Ibid.
[50] Ibid, 21.
[51] Ibid.
[52] Ibid.
[53] Ibid.
[54] Ibid, 22.
[55] Ibid, 23.
[56] Ibid, 24. Evidently, this portion of the transcript missed something as such a thought was merely repeated.
[57] Ibid, 27.
[58] Ibid.
[59] Ibid.
[60] T.s.n., Session of
[61] Ibid, 65-66.
[62] Ibid, 79-80.
[63] Ibid, Session of
[64] Ibid, Session of
[65] Ibid,
Session of
[66] Ibid.
[67] Ibid, 54.
[68] Ibid.
[69] The question and answer covered forty-five pages of the stenographic notes.
[70] T.s.n., Session of
[71] Ibid, 29-30.
[72] Ibid, 30.
[73] Ibid.
[74] Ibid, 31.
[75] Ibid.
[76] Ibid, 31-32.
[77] Ibid, 32.
[78] Ibid.
[79] Ibid, 33.
[80] Ibid,
Session of
[81] Ibid.
[82] Ibid.
[83] Ibid, 11.
[84] Ibid, 12.
[85] Ibid, 13.
[86] Ibid.
[87] Ibid, 16.
[88]
L-39716,
[89] Ibid,
264. Cf. People v.